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In 1968, the University of Michigan Law Review published an article enti-
tled, "Through A Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and The
Law."' Its author was George P. Smith. With this article Smith embarked
upon an adventure that has clearly established him as a prescient prophet of
the New Biology. 2 The publication of the three books under current review
attests further to his commitment to "look in dark places and to shed light
on what he . . . sees there."3 This is the penultimate role of the true
scholar. Once the light has been shed, it is for others to "decide whether the
vision is true or distorted and, even if it is true, whether to pay attention to
what they see or to continue to live with their illusions." 4
The enormity of the research and the penetrating analyses in Smith's
books shed a bright light on the multiple and complex problems of contem-
porary health law. The effort in these books is not dull and "synthetic," 5 but
1. 67 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968).
2. See the Bibliography of Professor Smith's writing in the field listed herein.
3. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 180 (1984); Calabresi,
Correspondence to Paul D. Carrington, 35 J. LEGAL ED. 23 (1985).
4. Id.
5. Calabresi, Grant Gilmore and the Golden Age, 92 YALE L. J. 1, 2 (1982).
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creative work of the first order that structures a framework for principled
decision-making; it provides both a glimpse of law in action and an impetus
for law reform.
The writings of Hippocrates discuss the control of hemmorhage by use of
local cold, and during the Napoleonic Wars there were numerous reported
successes where local hypothermia was induced to deaden pain during am-
putations.6 Working with low temperature experiments in the 1950's, biolo-
gists designed the term "cryobiology" to describe those investigations that
were conducted well below normal body temperatures.' The modem term
"cryogenics" refers broadly to the technology of low temperature experi-
ments, and the term "cryonics" to all disciplines centered on human cold
storage.
8
Today's successes in cryobiology include the freeze-preservation of viable
cell suspensions, blood serum, micro-organisms, and semen; it also includes
non-viable tissues used for transplantation, cryosurgery, and the preserva-
tion of large mammalian organs.9 Although these successes are significant,
there has yet to be a complete cryonic suspension of an entire human body
and its revival.' 0 It is only when a complete revival has been documented
that the so-called cryonic or immortality movement will be fully recognized.
While twenty-four cryonic suspensions have been reported, only nine cases
have been actually verified."
Through cryonic suspension, the inevitability of old age and even death is
challenged. Cryonic suspension is normally administered after death-with
the body being frozen and stored at either the temperature of liquid nitrogen
or liquid helium until scientific advances have conquered the incurable ill-
ness that brought about the death, and new life becomes possible. 2 The
cryon (the cryonically suspended individual) is thereupon taken from his
container-coffin, thawed, revived, repaired of the debilitating illness, and
given a restored life.' 3
Smith explores with meticulous care the fascinating history of what has
6. MEDICAL-LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRYONICS: PROSPECTS FOR IMMORTALITY 7 (1983).
7. See Smith, The Iceperson Cometh: Cryonics, Law and Medicine, 1 1. CONTEMP.
HEALTH IssuEs 23 (1983).
8. Id.
9. Hazur, Cryobiology: The Freezing of Biological Systems, 168 SCIENCE 939 (1970).
10. Supra note 6, at 19.
11. Id. at 18.
12. See Smith, Intimations of Immortality: Clones, Cryons and The Law, 6 UNIv. NEW
So. WALES L. J. 119 (1983).
13. Supra note 6, at 16.
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been termed the "Immortalist Movement,"' 4 whose impetus is traced to the
1964 publication of Dr. Robert Ettinger's book, THE PROSPECT OF IMMOR-
TALITY. 1 5 From sixteen to twenty life extension societies, or Cryonics As-
sociations, exist in the United States alone and are directed toward the
promotion of the science of cryonics and the elimination of death. 16
Putting aside ethical and moral considerations, the use and development
of cryonic suspension poses three central legal problems: the extent to which
a physician may be guilty of malpractice in assisting with a suspension (ow-
ing to present weaknesses in defining death and the co-ordinate liability for
murder attaching thereto), the need for legal recognition of the state of "sus-
pension," and the present effect of the law's anachronistic treatment of estate
devolution upon a cryon's suspension.' 7
Seeking to clarify the phenomenon of death and thereby define it, in 1981
The President's Commission for The Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research gave its unanimous approval to the
drafting of a Uniform Determination of Death Act that defined death as an
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or the irrevers-
ible cessation of all functions of the entire brain (including the brain stem).
The Act has yet to be adopted widely by the states."8 Thus, no single crite-
rion is recognized as entirely satisfactory for the determination of death that
can substitute for the overall reasonable judgment of an attending physician
under the particular circumstances of each case.' 9 If one were to be sus-
pended before a determination of death, the attending physician would not
only be guilty of civil malpractice or causing "harm" to his patient but-
from a criminal standpoint-be liable for murder, the purposeful taking of
another's life.
For the estate planner, the issue becomes how the law should treat the
disposition of the decedent's estate.2 ° And the Rule Against Perpetuities,
which mandates that an interest in property must vest within twenty-one
years plus a life in being, plays havoc with the cryon's estate.2' If a modern
Rule Against Perpetuities were fashioned consistent with the advances of the
New Biology and the state of cryonics, one could be allowed to remain in a
state of cryonic suspension for twenty-one years without fear of being pro-
14. Id. at Ch. 2.
15. Id. at 16.
16. See R. ETTINGER, MAN INTO SUPERMAN (1972).
17. Supra note 6, at Chs. 3, 4.
18. Id. at 27.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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nounced dead. At the conclusion of this period, it would be for a court to
determine whether such a possibility (or feasibility of a scientific break-
through) exists for a cure of the disease of the person in suspension. Smith
suggests, with a creative flair, that if the state-of-the-art had advanced to
such a level that a successful cure for the suspended person's (cryon's) illness
existed, then the court could exercise its broad equitable powers of supervi-
sion to allow continued suspension for a period not to exceed ten additional
years-at which time a final determination is to be made regarding the status
of the cryonically suspended person. Contrariwise, if-at the end of the ini-
tial twenty-one year period-a judicial determination were made that no im-
mediate or scientific advances promised the realistic hope of a cure of the
cryon's malady, then in all likelihood a decision could be made to thaw the
suspended individual, thereby recognizing that death has occurred, and the
estate could be settled.22
For the process of cryonic suspension to be promoted and encouraged
before a legal determination of death, the participating physician-scientist-
lay person would have to receive an exculpation from civil liability in the
contract for cryonic suspension which would assumedly be drawn before the
process commenced. Such a recognition would be memorialized in an excul-
patory clause within the contract conferring an immunity from civil liability
for the participants for either a failure to find a cure for the illness of the
cryon during the period of suspension or for participating in or supervising a
medical-surgical intervention (i.e., the initial suspension itself) determined
subsequently by a court to be life ending. It would, of course, be wise to
have a judicial recognition of the immunity from criminal prosecution for
"murder" in connection with the acts of cryonic suspension undertaken by a
physician on a living individual, or a state statute that would admit as an
absolute bar or total defense the acts undertaken to initiate the suspension
before a legal determination of death.23
In cases where one seeks to have his or her remains cryonically preserved
after a determination of death is made, the law should be less flexible than in
the cases where suspension is undertaken before death. Indeed, the failure to
recognize a death as death would wreak havoc not only with the law of
property and succession, but would act to destabilize the very social and
religious fabric of society. It boggles the mind to conceive of a society where
there is no ultimate end to the existence of many of its members.
Smith next moves to consider the hypothetical case of In re Glover before
22. Id. at 28.
23. Id.
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the United States Supreme Court2 -a case where the issue litigated is
whether or not Ralph Glover "died" as a consequence of his cryonic suspen-
sion administered before a determination of death or whether he was and is
in a state of true cryonic suspension and thus not dead. This paradigm
probes the most germane legal issues raised previously by the use of cryonics
and then investigates with specificity the elements of designing and adminis-
tering an estate plan for a cryon.25 An insurance plan for cryonic suspension
for a number of years could be provided for by a policy being written on the
life of the future cryon that would pay a benefit at "death" to its estate for
whatever amount was thought necessary to maintain the necessary
suspension.1
6
In order to assist in the legal validation of a cryonic suspension, Smith
concludes his analysis by presenting four legal forms: a Body Authorization
Form to allow preparation of the act of suspension, 27 a Funeral Home
Agreement authorizing the supervision of the act,2" a Model Inter Vivos
Trust to provide for the subsequent administration of a suspension,29 and a
Model Cryonic Suspension Affidavit that includes exculpatory provisions
providing immunity from liability for misuse of the cryon or actual mishap
during the act of cryonic suspension.3
0
II.
In ETHICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHALLENGES TO A BRAVE
NEW WORLD, Smith has selected nineteen essays that present a panorama
of complexities and hopes comprising the so-called "New Biology." Observ-
ing the delicate and vexatious nature of the biomedical decisions that call
into focus highly charged areas of autonomy, life, death, and freedom of
scientific inquiry, Smith posits a test thesis which he submits is inherent
when any critical decision is necessary to resolve a particular controversy
involving contemporary health law. This test seeks to weigh the utility of
the good (economic, social, cultural, or political) of maintaining the status
quo against the gravity of the harm of undertaking a new and different
course of action. He writes: "The simple, yet sometimes elusive goal of any
deliberative process involving the technologies of the present and the future
should always be to maximize the total potential for human growth, devel-
24. Id. at 30-35.
25. Id. at Ch. 4.
26. Id. at 47. The range for the policy is from $75,000.00 to $100,000.00
27. Appendix A.
28. Appendix B.
29. Appendix C.
30. Appendix D.
1986]
178 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:173
opment of inter-personal reactions and intellectual fulfillment and-at the
same time-minimize all suffering connected with the attainment and per-
petuation of this lifetime goal."'" While the sanctity of life, from its concep-
tion through its natural conclusion, is an absolute, the realities of modem
medicine point to the facts that qualitative standards of evaluation are being
utilized in a growing number of cases and the ethics of each particular at-
risk situation becomes more and more significant.
The first essay in the first volume enunciates with clarity and wisdom the
theme of the entire two volumes: the great value of life from the total view-
point of living and dying.32 Initial life is shaped in the womb, and a proce-
dure known as genetic screening can make a determination about the quality
of life a fetus will experience after birth. In other words, is the fetus carrying
a genetic abnormality (such as Down's syndrome) that will possibly prevent
it from leading the type of life some would view as without handicap? In a
growing number of cases, given this information, prospective parents may
decide to abort the fetus. The second essay investigates the new and ex-
panding field of genetic screening and the various legal theories for imposing
liability on physicians for errors in their diagnoses which have an outcome in
the birth of a genetically defective infant.3
Because of various medical and genetic difficulties, an alarming number of
individuals are unable to father or mother a child. Thus, artificial insemina-
tion and surrogate motherhood are growing in popularity as mechanisms to
correct these problems; the third and fourth essays deal with them.34 The
book considers next the juridical status of the unborn fetus together with the
proposed 1981 Helms-Hyde Bills in the United States Congress concerning
the beginnings of life at conception and the governmental protection ex-
tended thereto. 35
After having explored the beginnings of life, the sixth essay investigates
the conclusion of life and the self-autonomous right to accelerate such con-
31. Vol. 1, Preface and Introduction.
32. Id., Ch. 1, Fried, The Value of Life.
33. Id., Ch. 2, Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counselling.
34. Id., Ch. 3, Smith, A Close Encounter of the First Kind: Artificial Insemination and An
Enlightened Judiciary, Ch. 4, Erickson, Contracts to Bear A Child.
35. Id., Ch. 5, King, The Juridical Status of The Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of
the Unborn. Id., The Helms-Hyde Proposal Briefing Paper at 151-152. These bills not only
struck down prohibitions imposed by the states on abortions by mandating federal district and
appelate courts to refrain from hearing any case involving abortion related issues, but would
have seen the federal government declaring that life begins at the moment of conception and
guaranteeing full constitutional protection to the civil rights of these "persons." Id. These
bills were, of course, never enacted into legislation.
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clusions.36 The seventh essay, pertaining to ethical tribunals,a3 deals with
collective decision-making as an aid here. The concluding essays probe the
partnership between law, science, and medicine as they chart the parameters
of the "New Biology.""a The last piece especially considers the role of gov-
ernment in advocating and protecting a guaranteed right of scientific
inquiry.39
Volume Two opens with rather controversial observations by the Nobel
Laureate, Linus Pauling, on the need for so-called genetic integrity and con-
tainment.' Developing an exploration of the parameters of genetic policies
that would impact dramatically on political, ethical, social, and legal spheres
of action, the second4' and third essays42 test the compatibility of eugenic
policies designed to breed the "best" qualities of man with the dangers of
such actions to the fundamental right of self-determination and what some
consider the absolute imperative for genetic heterogeneity. In a most imagi-
native and intriguing manner, the fourth essay explores the allocation of
scarce resources or selection of modes of health care delivery (e.g. triage). 43
The central focus of the four succeeding chapters is eugenic selection or
advancement." Researchers select those upon whom they perform their ex-
perimentations-either for therapeutic benefits or for pure research-for a
variety of reasons. The experimental subjects may be terminal medical
cases, mental retards, imprisoned criminals, infants, or individuals coerced
in some way. Because of the unequal bargaining power of people in these
positions, authorities often consider informed consent to the experimenta-
tion to be unnecessary. The interest of the State in promoting and maintain-
ing a policy of genetic advancement may result in laws preventing mentally
retarded individuals from entering into marriage contracts. State interest
36. Id., Ch. 6, Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerg-
ing Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus.
37. Id. Ch. 7, Dagi, The Ethical Tribunal in Medicine.
38. Id., Ch. 8, Berger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine; id., Ch. 9,
Cavalieri, Science as Technology; id., Ch. 10, Delgado & Miller, God, Galileo and Government:
Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry.
39. Id., Delgado & Miller, supra note 38.
40. Vol. 2, Ch. 1, Pauling, Reflections on The New Biology.
41. Id., Ch. 2, Canavan, Genetics, Politics and The Image of Man.
42. Id., Ch. 3, Vukowich, The Dawning of The Brave New World-Legal, Ethical and
Social Issues of Eugenics.
43. Id., Ch. 4, Annas, Allocation of Artificial Hearts in the Year 2002: Minerva v. Na-
tional Health. See generally Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities, I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 143 (1985).
44. Vol. 2, Ch. 5, Macklin & Sherwin, Experimenting on Human Subjects: Philosophical
Perspectives; Ch. 6, Breggin, Psychosurgery for Political Purposes; Ch. 7, Beyer, Madness and
Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs; Ch. 8, Shaman, Persons Who
Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children.
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may also result in legal decrees of sterilization to prevent eugenically weak-
ened offspring from being born and becoming economic burdens on society
at large.45
Owing to extreme shortages of qualified personnel to staff mental institu-
tions and a growing reluctance to allow mentally imbalanced individuals to
live in deinstitutionalized settings, the State oftentimes follows the most ex-
pedient and less costly procedure of forcibly administering drugs to restrain
the inmates. The State sadly abridges psychic and functional integrity in the
name of fiscal solvency. To be sure, all these courses of action rob-to one
degree or other-the at-risk individual of his autonomy. They abridge his
fundamental rights. But at the same time, these actions achieve the greatest
economic good for the greatest number of citizens: utilitarianism at its
zenith! These four essays, then, explore these and other problems and offer
sobering evaluations of the consequences of action or of inaction. With a
growing climate of secularism, it may be fair to expect more compromise of
what tradition has recognized as human or basic values, in the name of ad-
vancing a policy designed to maximize the quality of the human "experi-
ment" through eugenic advancement and economic responsibility.
In that connection, it is fitting to close these reflections on the challenges
of the New Biology to the "Brave New World" by considering a thoughtful
essay on various theological perceptions of the effect of religion on the new
genetic technology and vice versa. Professor David H. Smith, the author of
the essay, observes that a vital religious tradition, Christian or otherwise,
and a policy of laissez faire in medical technology cannot exist together.4
So long as religious people think . . . some of them will come to
conclusions which require a thorough inspection of the road ahead,
if not emergency braking. Conforming our individual or common
behavior to their suggestions may be very inconsistent. No one's
views should be canonized . . . . If we fail to see that medical
technology, including new reproductive technologies, must serve
us-our opinions, traditions and values-then we will have for-
saken their very raison d'etre.4 7
III.
Smith's third book is entitled GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW. It
is a tour deforce of considerable dimension. Stating that the current quest to
manipulate the human genetic code results simply from both the traditional
45. Id.
46. Id., Ch. 9, Smith, Theological Reflections on The New Biology.
47. Id. at 258.
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societal desire to advance scientific knowledge and thereby to rid the world
of diseases and infirmity, together with the more modem objective to provide
children to infertile marriage partners who desire a family,4" Smith acknowl-
edges that in order to combat disease, genetic engineering may-and fre-
quently does-rely upon eugenics, the science that is concerned with the
improvement of heredity.49 The central problem that arises as a conse-
quence of current efforts to manipulate the genetic code concerns man's re-
actions to his new spheres of self-knowledge. 0 "As man acquires these
Godlike powers, he must endeavor to execute them with a rational purpose
and in a spirit of humanism; he should seek to minimize human suffering. ""1
He submits that genetic engineering that is promotive of and contributes to
the social good should be utilized fully.5 2
Smith introduces some fascinating and sobering statistics on genetically
transmissible diseases (e.g., retinoblastoma, Huntington's chorea) 3 and the
statistical probabilities of a married couple with a congenital abnormality
and/or mental defect having had one child so afflicted with such a genetic
anomaly having another such child.54 Smith then discusses genetic educa-
tion and counseling as alternatives to the pain and anguish of birthing an
offspring who-in most cases-is foredoomed to a brief life of excruciating
suffering. 5 He uses current judicial cases to illustrate major positions and in
the copiously developed footnotes he presents a skillful expansion of central
themes and ideas together with comparative analyses. Dogmatism is never
an attitude in this work. Rather, there is a carefully crafted analysis of the
"state of the biological art" and its positive and negative potential to assist
man in leading a fuller, richer, and less diseased life.
In Chapter Two, Smith analyzes the effects of a negative eugenics pro-
gram: i.e., one which seeks to restrain or actually prevent certain individuals
from either marriage or procreation. 6 Compulsory genetic screening at
birth or prior to marriage or genetic counseling might well be recognized as
unconstitutional, since the taking of a child's blood sample upon birth could
48. See generally Smith, Genetics, Eugenics and the Family: Exploring the Yin and the
Yung, 8 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 4 (1984); G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 1
(1981).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 15. See generally C. AUERBACH, THE SCIENCE OF GENETICS (rev. ed. 1969);
A. SCHEINFELD, YouR HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT (1963).
55. Id. passim.
56. Id.
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be viewed as a physical invasion of the body in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and a compulsory counseling program after marriage would
surely be regarded as a direct interference with the fundamental right to
marry and procreate. 7 Pre-marital genetic screening, however, would be a
relatively easy addition to State statutes that already require pre-marital test-
ing for blood group and Rh status, and forbid marriage among degrees of
consanguinity.
58
Eugenic sterilization laws are still in place in a number of states. The
most outstanding judicial precedent upholding the constitutionality of laws
of this nature, Buck v. Bell, decided in 1927, 59 remains a strong precedent
and has yet to be overruled directly.' In this case, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute providing for sterilization of in-
mates committed to state-supported institutions who were found to have a
hereditary form of insanity or imbecility. 6' The judicial extension of this
decision-to the sterilization of carriers of recessive defective genes, for ex-
ample--could not be accomplished very easily, if at all, since the Supreme
Court has recognized marriage and the begetting of children as fundamental
rights.6 2
Efforts to promote a positive approach to the improvement of the genetic
profile of society of its gene pool are commonly viewed as being within the
rubric of a program for positive eugenics. 63 Artifical insemination by a do-
nor (AID), in vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood contracts, to-
gether with forms of asexual reproduction (i.e., cloning, parthenogenesis)
would all form a central focus of such a program." While one could struc-
ture an argument that recognizes the state's inherent legal right of parens
patriae or its broad police powers to promote policies designed to protect
and enhance the gene pool of its citizens, there are monumental issues of
constitutional law to be resolved before such a program could be validated.
For example, if a legislative program were to allow only individuals with
superior genetic endowments to clone, it could be challenged as an obvious
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because of its
essential discrimination between those with superior genetic traits and all
57. Id. at 19.
58. Id.
59. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
60. Supra note 48, at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id. See Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REV.
63 (1984).
63. Supra note 48, at Ch. 5.
64. Id. See Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, 5 WES. NEW ENG. L. REV. 639 (1982).
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others.6 5 Still another challenge to a state's interest in the propagation of
superior traits might be maintained, however, on the ground that such a
state interest violates the U.S. Consitution's Thirteenth Amendment or the
so-called Nobility Clause that prohibits the imposition of involuntary
servitudes.6 6
As indicated, artifical insemination by a donor (AID) is a very common
method used to complement not only a positive eugenics program, but also
as a means to allow an otherwise infertile married couple to have a child. If
a married man's sperm is defective, semen from a donor may legally be ob-
tained artificially (with the husband's consent) and administered to the wife.
More and more states are no longer acknowledging such a situation as adul-
terous nor the offspring as illegitimate.6 7
The newer methods of reproduction-such as in in vitro fertilization, em-
bryo implantation, as well as cloning and parthenogenesis-are, when uti-
lized, producing genetic children of one of the parents but not the other.68
Indeed, perfection of in vitro fertilization and embryo implants will allow the
birth of a child who is neither the genetic child of the woman who bore him
nor that of her husband. 69 Although these technolgies could introduce a
radically new dimension into the concept of the traditional family, as a prac-
tical and human process it is Smith's opinion that the children born of such a
process should be legitimized by civil law.7 ° The legal problems associated
with these new techniques do not differ significantly from those already
presented and resolved for the most part with artificial insemination by a
donor, he writes, and should be dealt with accordingly.7 1
Granted, Smith says, not every married couple is entitled to have a child.
But for those who wish to seek the assistance of the new reproductive tech-
nologies for marital fulfillment rather than suffer the uncertainties of the
adoptive process7 2 or the pain of a barren marriage, society should assist in
the process by the legitimation of the offspring; for surely the very essence of
society's continuance is tied to reproduction within or without the practical
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id.
67. Supra note 63. See generally Smith, Close Encounters of The First Kind: Artificial
Insemination and an Enlightened Judiciary, 17 J. FAM. LAW 41 (1978); Smith, Through A
Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and The Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127 (1968).
68. Id. at 118. See Smith, Australia's Frozen Orphan Embryos: A Medical, Legal and
-Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. LAw 27 (1985).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 119.
72. See Landes & Posner, The Economics of The Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978).
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bounds of a marriage contract. Smith opines that the best interests of society
and of the offspring in cases of this nature mandate legal action.
In order to justify an intentional invasion of one's bodily integrity, free
and informed consent must be obtained. This is the pivotal issue on which
hangs the majority of not only the basic ethical problems in human experi-
mentation, but also the growing number of cases dealing with medical mal-
practice as well as those involving surgical misfeasance and nonfeasance. 73
If one is without capacity to consent to a therapeutic or non-therapeutic
modality of medical or surgical treatment, then his consent must be obtained
from one empowered by kinship or court decree to consent for him.74
The underlying legal principle of informed consent is a recognition of a
right to refuse not only treatment, but experimentation, efforts to modify
behavior, or any other actions which interfere with one's autonomy or right
of self-determination.75 With increasing regularity, the courts are recogniz-
ing a right to refuse medical treatment based upon religious beliefs; but re-
fusal by an individual cannot jeopardize the life of another. Thus, a
pregnant woman could not legally refuse emergency treatment and thereby
put her unborn child at-risk.76 Courts have recognized, further, that prison
confinement in no way should qualify one's right to refuse to participate in
any form of treatment or experimentation.77
In a landmark case in 1884, decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court, it was held that, as to pre-natal torts, a fetus could not recover
damages for injuries sustained while in its mother's womb.78 It was not until
1946 that judicial temperament changed, with the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,
which held that injuries to an unborn child which is viable are compensable
in an action maintained by the child after it is born.79 While today tort
liability exists for wrongfully causing one to be born, the recognition of this
liability has yet to develop uniformly into an equal recognition that a child
"wrongfully born" may sue in its own right for that wrongful life.80
Smith examines at length the classic case distinction between actions for
wrongful birth and wrongful life."' In wrongful birth actions, parents of a
73. Supra note 48, at 32.
74. Id
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 42.
77. Id. at 43, 44. See generally J. KATZ & A CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO
DECIDES WHAT (1975); C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY
AND SOCIAL POLICY (1974).
78. Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
79. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
80. Supra note 48, at 80.
81. Id. at 70.
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child who is usually "unplanned" maintain a suit against a physician for
negligent performance of a sterilization operation.8 2 An action for wrongful
life breaks down into the elements of a common action in negligence.8 3 At
its base is an existing legal duty on the part of someone to either insure that
the infant is not born or that the proper disclosure be made to its parents
(normally through genetic screening) for their decision as to whether or not
the pregnancy should continue to term.84 Obviously, the most difficult prob-
lem establishing either of these tort actions is causation."
The book considers next the role of governmental supervision of scientific
study and research, with the observation that scientists make the vast bulk of
their research decisions without public involvement-the only guide for
their actions being an international code of ethics for clinical research.86 In
the interest of individual liberty and freedom of experimentation, Smith ad-
vocates a strong non-interventionist approach by the government; in his zeal,
he almost overlooks entirely the valid needs of the State to become involved
in the critical decisions of the "New Biology."
Starting in 1966, the Surgeon General of the United States announced that
the United States Public Health Service would not grant, renew, or continue
to support research programs involving humans unless the institutions at
which the research was being conducted undertook a review of the risks and
potential medical benefits of the research, the rights and the personal welfare
of the research subjects, and the need for their informed consent to partici-
pate.87 Subsequent federal governmental action advancing these concerns
and needs occurred in 1973 and 1974 with appropriate regulations address-
ing the matter being issued.88 In 1974, Congress established the National
Commission for The Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research and charged it to identify basic ethical principles for bi-
omedical and behavioral research involving human subjects.8 9 The
Commission issued various recommendations, addressing such issues as non-
therapeutic fetal research, ex utero research, research on prisoners, genetic
engineering, and decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment.' Even with
his reluctance to countenance federal intrusions into any areas of personal
(scientific) freedom, Smith does recognize that-as to this Commission-its
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 81.
86. Id. at 130.
87. Id. at 131.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 132.
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recommendations balanced satisfactorily the need for continued scientific re-
search with the needs for ethical standards of guidance.9
Defining Bioethics as an attempt to develop a philosophy regarding the
application of man's biological knowledge in furtherance of the social
good,92 Smith proceeds to draw upon Teilhard de Chardin's "Omega
Point"9 3 as the focus for his subsequent analysis of the bioethical conun-
drum: how normative standards should be structured and what standards
should be sued for, applying genetic rules of research and development for
future generations.94 His answer to this problem is for the law to recognize
that "[s]ociety should encourage, not stifle, research; for a society unable to
accept and encourage either current or future behavioral variations does not
promote a hospitable environment for the free development and expression
of ideas of any kind. Man cannot learn by merely thinking in this area."95
In the final chapter of this absorbing work, Smith treats the topic of "Sci-
ence and Religion: Compatibilities and Conflicts."96 Recognizing science as
"ordered knowledge," and that probabilities are at the center of all scientific
inquiry, he admits that absolute truth is not within its realization.97 Contra-
riwise, the admixture of feelings and beliefs in religion is a source of both
mystery and incomprehensibility to the scientist,98 with scientists' view of
faith as a rather "primitive principle."9 9
Regarding the new reproductive technologies, the Roman Catholic
Church considers the contract of marriage as an exclusive one which forbids
intercourse with a third person and/or the use of semen from a donor to
effect artificial congress."° Adultery is adultery, regardless of whether a
husband gives his consent for his wife to be impregnated by a donor's
sperm,' ' and the Church automatically rejects fertilization by donor ga-
metes in vivo or in vitro. 102 As to sterilization, the position of the Church is
91. Id.
92. Id. at 145.
93. For Chardin, the "Omega Point" was that cultural stage in the evolutionary process
where the minds of men attain a common language of scientific humanism as a workable
philosophy. Id. See P. CHAUCHARD, MAN AND COSMOS 153-156 (1965).
94. Supra note 48, at 146. See generally Marcin, Justice and Love, 33 CATH. U. L. REV.
363 (1984).
95. Id. at 147.
96. Id. at Ch. 9.
97. Id. at 153; see generally Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion and The
New Biology, 3 PACE U. L. REV. 63 (1982).
98. Id.
99. Id. See B. RUSSEL, THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY (1952); A WHITEHEAD,
SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1926).
100. Id. at 155.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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again prohibitive.'03
Contemporary liberal, Protestant philosophy considers that there are no
universal modes of conduct required of Christians but that the critical deter-
minant in any relationship is love. If love is proven, then no particular ac-
tion undertaken within the confines of the New Biology is prohibited."
Conservative Protestant religious ethic, however, disagrees with this posture
and holds that the Bible is the divine expression of God's unalterable will
and that a monogamous marriage is part of this will.' 05 The clear inference
to be drawn here is that artificial insemination by a donor (AID) is not only
morally objectionable, but an invasion of the unity of the monogamous rela-
tionship"° and-further-that genetic engineering or manipulation by in vi-
tro fertilization or the other new reproductive technologies qualifies as an
offensive sexual relation.' °7 Traditional Protestant ethics, however, allows
the State to act justifiably (that is, in a reasonable manner) to effect compul-
sory sterilization.'0"
Under most of the Jewish religious perspective, a married woman partici-
pating in AID is not guilty of adultery, the issue born is considered to be
legitimate regardless of whether the woman is married or unmarried, and
the third party donor of the semen is always recognized as the natural fa-
ther. " Sterilization is prohibited, yet where designed to save life, is permis-
sible. The Orthodox faith would probably disallow State actions to sterilize
incompetent criminals. " 0
When explorations of the New Biology are designed to minimize human
levels of suffering and maximize the social good, Smith advocates that they
should be undertaken."' It is his opinion that the search to balance the
gravity of the harm against the utility of the good of each new exploration
charts both the initial feasibility and the ultimate direction of the undertak-
ing. Herman J. Muller, the distinguished geneticist and late Nobel Laureate,
once observed:
The mind of man must more and more become the master, not
only of the outer material world, and so too of his social world, but
also of the genetic thread of life within him. Thus, there will come
103. Id. at 156.
104. Id. See generally Smith, Uncertainties on The Spiral Staircase: Metaethics and The
New Biology, 41 THE PHAROS 10 (1978).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 157.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 164.
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an even greater freedom. ... Intelligence. . . has of late grown
astonishingly; but without a corresponding growth in social moti-
vation and in the means of carrying it out, man's great new tools-
so much more dangerous and more easily misdirected on a large
scale than were the primitive instruments of the past-may work
only misery and even destruction. Love must balance knowledge
or we fail.11
2
Richly balanced appendices-ten in all-bring added strength to this vol-
ume.11 3 In addition to the rather standard inclusions of The Helsinki Decla-
ration on Clinical Research,'1 4 The Nuremberg Code of Ethics in Medical
Research,"' and The United Nations' Declaration on The Rights of Men-
tally Retarded Persons," 6 Professor Smith presents heretofore uncommon-
and in some cases rare-sources of information including a Model Informed
Consent Law, 17 a Proposed Voluntary Sterilization Act,"1 8 a Model Artifi-
cial Insemination Statute, 19 together with the Recommendations of The
National Commission for The Protection of Human Subjects (Prisoners) of
Biomedical Research' 2° and Children,' 2' the Amended 1980 Guidelines for
Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules,' 22 and The Belmont Report on
Ethical Principles for Treating Humans. 123
This book is a significant contribution to the literature of the New Biol-
ogy. Its strengths are to be found in its thorough and objective analyses, its
depth of research, and its insightful recommendations concerning the rele-
vant legal issues. It will serve as a valuable framework for principled analy-
sis of this new and exciting field. In none of these materials, however, does
Smith profess to be any more than a lawyer. His approaches eschew consid-
erations that are moral or ethical; they are strictly from a legal point of view.
112. H. MULLER, OUT OF THE NIGHT 43, 158 (1935).
113. Supra note 111, at 167-237.
114. Id at Appendix D.
115. Id at Appendix E.
116. Id. at Appendix I.
117. Id. at Appendix A.
118. Id. at Appendix B.
119. I at Appendix C.
120. Id at Appendix F.
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122. Id. at Appendix G.
123. Id at Appendix J.
